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Draft Only 
Constraints of Grassland Science, Pastoral Management and Policy in 




Conventional grassland science in China is underpinned with degradation narratives on 
the ecological decline of Inner Mongolian steppes; regarded as a consequence of cultural 
practices undertaken by ethnic-”minority” mobile pastoralists. Roe (1991) argues that 
“development narratives” as necessary policy blueprints are created and 
“operationalized” into standardised practices across the board. Grassland scientists can 
operate within these narratives disregarding anthropogenic/cultural implications of 
pastoralism, the extent of human impacts on the environment, traditional pastoral 
practices across variables in time and space, or even the extent to which human-animal 
interaction has caused degradation. The issue of “degradation” (and therefore the 
challenge of management) in grassland science presumes a particular view of the past 
often based on a misreading of contemporary landscapes – by reading history backwards 
(Fairhead and Leach 1996; Leach and Mearns 1996; on desertification narratives see 
Swift 1996).  
 
In this paper I offer a counter-narrative focussing on “post-traditional” (Eisenstadt 1973) 
mobile pastoralism based on two years’ field experience (2002-2004 and subsequent 
revisits 2006, 2010) as consultant on a China-Australia grassland management project in 
Inner Mongolia. In my analysis I follow debates that have become prominent in the last 
decade, on new interdisciplinary approaches to range- or grassland ecology and the 
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community-based management of pastures. In the late 1990s Humphrey and Sneath drew 
attention to regional scenarios of adaptation among “mobile pastoralists” of inner Asia 
and problems of top-down policy which undermined traditional mobility/livelihoods and 
led to the erosion of natural/indigenous resource-base
1
. They argued that maintaining 
forms of mobility and concordant district-level management will continue to be important 
if pastoralism (as a cultural and economic practice) is to be successful and sustainable in 
the steppe environment (Humphrey and Sneath 1999; see also Sneath 1998).  
 
The move towards household enclosures over the past twenty years remains a corner-
stone in conventional grassland management. As framed in mainstream development 
discourse in China (centred on the values of modernity, rationality, and economic 
growth), the administration of “household enclosures” operates with analytical tools 
presuming stability and uniformity, which downplays the importance of ongoing, 
customary pastoral practices
2
. In earlier work in a north-eastern corner of Inner 
Mongolia, I looked at household enclosures and their impact: negative effects on the 
natural resource-base, widening the inequality gap and increasing intra-household 
conflicts over land-use (Taylor 2006)
3
. A problem was the lack of understanding or 
empathy by technical specialists on traditional and changing cultural practices.  
 
In fact the traditional basic social unit among ethnic-Mongolian pastoralists was a fluid 
camp herding arrangement around patrilineal kinsmen. This was normally constituted by 
two to six households which managed their flocks/herds as a single integrated economic 
unit. Under collectivization, this arrangement was disrupted by massive southern Han in-
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migration 1960s-1970s including neighbouring provinces such as Jilin and Liaoning, also 
small-trade people from other sumu in the region. However, traditional practices and the 
notion of maintaining the commons remained strong core values within the basic unit of 
pastoral production at the aili (the “natural” village).  In Xing’an League, these villages 
were mostly established early- to mid-twentieth century and have remained substantially 
unchanged in terms of administration. Recently, since the introduction of household 
enclosures new social and economic tensions emerged between resource-users, even as 
poorer herders (with little or no livestock) seemed to begrudgingly accept their lot as their 
richer neighbours continue to expand enclosures. These poorer households, with little or 
no livestock, were often shepherds for the larger pastoralists.  
 
In project villages all families were related through agnatic kinship or marriage with the 
typical village having between thirty to fifty households. In a case study at Ganggan 
Village, in Middle Banner
4
, there were two or three influential households who controlled 
most decision-making. These richer households brought in wives from less prominent 
families and thus creating interlocking marriage ties. All villagers considered themselves 
a kindred network similar to all aili and the foundation of local cultural life and social 
order. Aili households support each other and poorer kindred, especially those without 
livestock, despite the recent household contracted UR system. Community/village rituals 
reinforce the sense of kindred ties. For instance, when a family kills a sheep, close 
relatives are invited to drink and eat. During New Year celebrations, when a pig is killed 
the feasting is shared with the entire village, with each family sending a representative to 
attend. Indeed, many ceremonies involve the entire village: weddings; a child’s one-
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month celebration; the admission of a student to university; the 49th, 61st and 73rd 
birthdays; funerals; post-burial rituals; and devotional and prosperity rituals to Aobao and 
various deities normally held May to August in the lunar calendar year. Through these 
practices of mutual benefit and collective participation, the cohesion of the community is 
confirmed, maintained and strengthened.  
 
The Xiang’an League project:  using policy solutions   
 
The Inner Mongolian Grasslands Management Project (IMGMP) was first proposed by 
China in 1992 with the first phase running from 1996 to 2001. The national partner was 
the league Animal Husbandry Bureau (AHB), since amalgamated into the Agriculture 
and Animal Husbandry Bureau (AAHB). In the project area the priority of the bureau 
was to regulate and ensure compliance in its programs. It was directed at protecting 
through its policies what is essentially the private value of animal capital and productivity 
from communal grasslands. The initiative of the government within the grasslands 
through AAHB amplifies an obvious priority of public investment in support of ongoing 
private (to the detriment of communal) benefits. 
 
The project area consisted of 59,000 sq.km covering four sumu (“township”, or Xian in 
Chinese) in Middle Banner (Kē'ěrqìn Yòuyì Zhōng Qí) and Front Banner (Kē'ěrqìn 
Yòuyì Qián Qí), in Xing’an League. The area is dominated by an extensive steppe of 
rolling hills and valleys (approximately 57 percent). Both banners combined have around 
21,666 sq. km of grasslands. This is the northern tip of the Kerquin Grasslands, which is 
 5 
found on light textured, often sandy soils. The geology of the area varies from igneous 
rock in the higher altitude north west of Xing’an League, adjacent to the Mongolian 
border, to sedimentary soils in the eastern section. The majority of people in fact are Han 
Chinese migrants (54 per cent), beside ethnic Mongolians and other regional ethnic 
groups such as Daur, Oroqen, Manchu, Ewenki, Hui, Xibe, and Koreans. Ethnic 
Mongolians now constitute only around 18% of the total population of Inner Mongolia 
(about 24.7 Million persons, as at 2010).  
 
The goal of the project, as stated in the design document, was to “improve the ongoing 
analysis and implementation of policies and regulations to promote sustainable, 
economic, utilisation of grassland resources” (China-Australia 2002: v). According to the 
same document, the problematic assumption underlying the project was that the effect of 
communal grazing and increases in numbers of livestock will, over time, lead to more 
severe degradation of the grasslands. Regional grassland specialists categorise 
degradation according to degrees of intensity: normal (potential), light, medium, heavy 
and even “very heavy” (i.e. dominated by annual grasses and forbs with very few 
perennial species, and a high level of bare soil from wind or water erosion). However, 
there does not appear to be a standard method to assign these categories. Grassland 
scientists talk about a “degradation series”, supposed to show the stages of vegetation that 
an ecological site goes through with increasing degradation caused by livestock 
overgrazing. In assessing the degradation stage, sampling of vegetation is undertaken.  
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The project worked with the User Rights (UR) or so-called “Two Rights One System” 
policy
5
, in place since the early 1980s as the “way to introduce favourable conditions for 
more sustainable grasslands management” (China-Australia 2002:17). A number of 
regulations were developed to support UR policy and further its aims, in particular 
relating to the transfer of UR (Order 99, n/d) and to encourage a balance between forage 
and animal production through the introduction of overgrazing penalties (Order 104, 
effective from 1 August 2000). There were also draft regulations relating to grazing fees. 
UR are to be allocated for an initial period of 30 years, after which time they can in 
theory be reallocated to take into account changes in household structure. The UR 
contract requires only one signature, usually by the male head of the household. UR can 
be passed over to the next generation through standard inheritance.  
 
In the first phase of the project, herders were issued with UR certificates and contracts, 
which included a map showing the allocation. These documents provided the right to 
graze up to a given number of livestock units on the designated area. These maximum 
numbers of livestock were based on scientific calculation of Sustainable Carrying 
Capacity
6
 (SCC, discussed later) for the allocated area. The SCC figure was also 
displayed on the UR certificate. Larger herders were given loans or grants to move away 
from the aili on the assumption that this would reduce grazing pressure on commons. 
This was not successful, as richer households took advantage of the situation, using both 
their new inducements and traditional rights to the commons, including hay land.  
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There was an attempt to monitor UR allocations and impacts since 1996 by conducting 
detailed baseline studies of farm production and income through a Livestock Statistics 
Information System (LSIS) and what was called the User Rights Information System 
(URIS). This was to provide a basis for assessing the effect of changes as UR were 
introduced. The project also collected and analysed economic information with respect to 
farm enterprises in each of the project sumu. Combined with technical information on 
herd/flock composition and grassland type, this information was to provide a reference-
base for assessing the effectiveness of interventions to raise farm productivity. The 
method used in the collection of all this data in phase one, however, made these tools 
substantially ineffective: firstly, there was no participatory information-gathering and -
sharing with farmers; secondly, relevant statistical data were sourced from local cadres 
and Banner Grassland Monitoring Station officials, ever keen to show increasing 
livestock productivity. This data was then processed by regional grassland scientists, 
tasked with research documentation and making recommendations to the AHB. 
Underpinning the whole approach was the simplistic narrative that partial privatization of 
the commons through the issuance of household UR would solve the problems of 
degradation. Indeed, to most herders in the project area, the expansion of desert was 
resulting from a combination of policy-driven increase in animal numbers and climate. 
The AAHB encouraged increase in animal production to receive financial inducements 
for achieving policy outcomes and inflating real numbers. The poorer Middle Banner in 
2006 had set targets for a further 50% increase over a five-year period. Indeed the AAHB 
is torn between the expansion of livestock and protecting the grasslands. People were also 
aware of the problem of goats on pastures and many said that despite the good prices for 
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cashmere relative to wool they had to sell many of their goats for sheep in order to keep 
the grassland from becoming desert.  
 
Essentially, the 1996-2001 project design (later changed because it was considered 
unworkable) identified that while “some progress” at privatization had taken place in the 
four project sumu, there was a problem in the “attitudes and behavior” of the herders. As 
simply stated by the herders, they did not want to work with an exogenous and “selfish” 
policy, but no one had talked with them about what they wanted to see instead. As 
development “psychologism” and modernization ideology it was nothing but the old 
“problem” of changing the “stubborn thinking” and “resistance” of pastoralists.  
 
The second phase of the project, 2002-2006, moved further away from the technocratic 
approach of the first phase. The first action of the team was to rework the original project 
design and start immediate revisions with local stakeholders. This was to shift the focus 
from enforcing policy mandates to engaging with herding communities, and from 
reliance on outdated and dubious statistical pastoral data and equilibrium-systems 
management tools to starting a community-driven learning process. Although reluctantly 
agreeing to revisions, the Australian company in charge of the project started to feel 
increasingly uneasy about altering an accepted top-down design. Rigid time-lines, 
milestones, and cost-benefit analyses tools embedded in the project design also prevents 
flexibility in implementation (Taylor 1999). In the revised design, pastoralists in selected 
gacha (formal administrative villages) participated in decision-making through local 
workshops. The shift to a more flexible community-driven approach was eventually 
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accepted though time run out before the project was able to scale-up changes on the 
benefits of group herding arrangements. 
 
A considerable amount of ethnographic research in the last fifteen years has shown that 
land privatization under UR has not worked and has failed to ensure ecological stability 
or improvement in livelihoods. Indeed, it has even been seen to cause increased 
impoverishment and environmental decline (Ho 1996; Williams 1996, 2002; Sneath 
2000; Rong Ma 2003, and Li and Huntsinger 2011; Wu and Du 2008). After the 
disbandment of the commune system in the early 1980s livestock was privatized to 
villagers as new problems emerged (Wang 2007: 7). At this time around 70 percent of 
grazing land was leased to individual households (Suttie and Reynolds 2003: 15).  
 
The government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region issued “Relevant 
Regulations on Further Fulfilling and Perfecting the Two Rights and One System” to 
prevent overstocking by defining livestock carrying capacity (CC) and fulfilling the 
grassland contract responsibility system. In essence, the policy demarcates pastures, 
restricts free-range grazing, encourages sedentarisation and controls stocking rates
7
. The 
most significant change in this policy was the emphasis on ecological protection over 
livestock output and income growth. It also involved local governments supporting 
herders to build livestock sheds, fencing and improving breeds (Wu and Du 2008: 18).  
 
 
The “Problem” of Environmental Degradation  
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The modern quandary of “degradation” is due to the restriction of pastoral movement 
since the 1980s, especially hurting poorer households (Humphrey and Sneath 1999: 276). 
As a loss of ecosystem function over a long period (Bai et al. 2008: 223), “degradation” 
is seen by herders as the noticeable reduction in the growth of grasses over an annual 
cycle; specifically reduced diversity in grass species; increase in unpalatable biomass 
(which is connected to overused pastures); decrease in vegetation density and 
distribution; reduction in water levels in rivers and the expansion of sandy areas and 
dunes (Humphrey and Sneath 1999:48). Most commonly degradation is defined by 
vegetation indicators, though Behnke and Scoones (1993: 24) suggested an expanded 
definition to include a diverse mix of biological and physical measures such as changes in 
soil, vegetation, livestock conditions and output.  
 
At the IMGMP, in order to make estimations of SCC across the whole project area 
scientists used a Stocking Rate Standard (SRS) model. The “one size fits all” SRS model 
assumes both temporal and spatial homogeneity. Henceforth in the project herders also 
became the active “instigators” of degradation. Appropriate stocking rates are related to 
the management system, though in non-equilibrium systems SCC and the maintenance of 
a steady balance between livestock numbers and available feed are the favored objectives 
for resource-users. Instead, it is best to incorporate more flexible and short-term 
responses to environmental dissimilarity based on local conditions, niche resources and 
allowance for (culturally preferred) swift adjustments to livestock numbers. This means 
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rethinking normative degradational narratives towards increased decentralization of 
grassland management under community-level responsibility (Ribot in Wang 2007: 2).   
 
In late 2005 new regulations allowed local authorities to control stocking rate though 
according to a much debated animal-feed balance approach and the imposition of fines 
for overstocking. At 55 aili in the Middle Banner, reviewed earlier in 2000, some 89% 
exceeded their notional SCC, in some case by over 500% (IMGMP 2006). Thus such 
external policing of animal numbers is problematic and certainly difficult to enforce 
(Banks 2001)
8
, aside from herder resistance and the lack of capacity by banner Grassland 
Monitoring Stations.  Although pastoralists wanted customary management this 
necessitates multi-stakeholder dialogue and feed-back into regional policy frameworks.   
 
 
In 2000-2005, experts from the Inner Mongolia Agricultural University and North 
America (Canada-China Sustainable Agriculture Development Project) worked on 
establishing a “Framework for a Range Condition and Stocking Rate” (Houston et al. 
2004). The framework was to quantitatively assess the impact of grazing on the 
grasslands for the purpose of recommending appropriate stocking levels. A stocking rate
9
 
guide was to be created that standardizes categorization of grassland conditions. 
Ecological sites were established that included information on dominant plant species, 
important land characteristics, soil types, soil moisture regime and potential plant 
communities. Vegetation was then collected to determine the percent by weight of 
increasers and decreasers of grasses, sedges, shrubs, and annuals. Thereafter, 
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approximate stocking rates were to be determined by season and level of site degradation. 
However, it needed to take into consideration the need to regularly assess climatic 
variability and changes in grassland condition. It also raised more questions than it 
answered. It was never adopted by managing agencies and it never engaged herders in 
their own vernacular/cultural understandings of ecology and livestock management.  
 
In IMGMP there was clearly environmental decline through pressure on the natural 
resource-base and corresponding low productivity. However, land degradation was 
clearly contested by the various resource users (see also Ho 2001; Miller 1999). As 
expected, smaller pastoralists tended to blame state policies which did not seem to work 
in their interests. Permanent degradation due to overgrazing was not common, as Behnke 
and Scoones (1993) also noted earlier in their African research, and where it did occur it 
was more than likely due to state interventions such as fencing (Williams 2002; Taylor 
2006). 
 
Historically, the degradation problem in Inner Mongolia starts in the late 1950s as 
livestock numbers increase despite the “grain-first” campaign until 1980. However, the 
extent of this increase is contested (Ma and Li 1993; Ho 2003: 48-49). The reason for this 
was the emphasis on increasing resource exploitation and need to meet food needs of an 
increasing population. In the 1980s policy continued to emphasise increased production 
exacerbating existing “grasslands-livestock” imbalances and skewing of resource benefits 
to larger better-connected herders. Wu and Du (2008) noted in central Xilingol League
10
 
that this policy peaked in 1996 when the livestock numbers reached 10 million. The 
 13 
writers, along with many critical scholars, show how state policy ignored grassland 
sustainability leading to widespread degradation, loss of productivity, and overall 
herders’ income. They suggest simply doing away with fences and the household 
enclosures altogether. Similarly, in this exemplary pastoral league, Wen et al. (2007) 
showed negative returns through privatisation. Most state livestock plans now stress 
feedlot systems, aside from seasonal grazing restrictions, as an attempt at reducing 
grazing pressure and restoring pasture productivity (Waldron et al. 2008: 4). The increase 
in grain production since 1979 and irrigation needs which drew heavily on groundwater 
supplies also affected grassland productivity. The soils in this region are in any case 
always short of water with high soil evaporation and plant transpiration (Ren et al. 2011).  
 
 
Assessing Policy from the culture of the grassroots 
 
At the core of my argument is that existing grassland policies have not been shown to 
work and need to include processes that give the herding community a central role. The 
root of the problem in trying to ensure sustainable grassland management is a lack of 
interdisciplinary know-how and weak multi-stakeholder participation. The “new 
grassland ecology”, which seems to be understood by pastoralists, emphasises 
“movement” and flow, anthropogenic and climate considerations. These challenge 




Notions of “overgrazing” derived from a particular model of ecology can become 
wrapped up in the representation of particular groups of people, who are then seen as one 
with the causes of environmental degradation. As mentioned above, the early project thus 
focussed on changing herder “attitudes” and “behaviour”. However, ethnic Mongolian 
herders transform the landscape as a lived space based on knowledge of immediate 
experience, as specific dwelling practices. In planning interventions in the landscape, it is 
necessary to privilege the understanding that these pastoralists derive from their “lived 
worlds” (Ingold 1993: 152). The cultural filters through which local actors (“dwellers”) 
perceive nature and the landscape has important consequences in the way both 
insiders/dwellers and outsiders act in this landscape (Hong 2005; Humphrey and Sneath 
1996). It is also necessary to appreciate the limits of scientific prediction, management 
and control with regard to the complexity and uncertainty of socio-ecological systems 
(Scoones 1999: 490).  
 
Many herders in fact blamed policy interventions for the perceived decline in natural 
resources, the loss of traditional grazing practices, and the overall erosion of culture. On 
the other hand, many others agreed that, given their now largely sedentary life, state-
supported protection of above-ground biomass and grassland improvement is necessary. 
Even in this case though, herders felt that management interventions must be undertaken 
on their cultural terms and frames of reference – not that of outsiders. Although 
traditional grazing practices have changed due to many factors, cultures adapt while 
solutions to identified problems need to come from the village/grasslands. Notions of 
what is “best [possible] practice” management must be established in the grasslands with 
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pastoralists, not in the research centres. It is the herders who know “best” about their 
local situation from an “education of attention” (Ingold 1993: 153), but this needs to be a 
learning involving all relevant stakeholders for it to be institutionalised.  
 
 
Some Grassland User Right (UR) Issues 
 
As mentioned earlier, in the original project design it had proposed “changing attitudes 
and behaviours” of herders. At the same time, there were doubts, at project management 
level, as to whether the regulations could be implemented, particularly those relating to 
overgrazing penalties to achieve reductions in livestock numbers. Grazing fees, which 
seemed easier to implement, proved impossible to collect in the gacha.  
 
In 2002 revisions were made to the original design and included reflection/learning 
workshops involving mid-level institutions (sumu, banner and regional) and local-level 
stakeholders (male and female pastoralists and local cadres).  These early consultations 
on UR raised questions concerning access and equity; animal and human population 
dynamics; intensification and pressure on grazing and natural resource decline.  UR 
policy/privatisation does not lead to reduced grazing pressure. The current, wide-scale re-
allocation of pastures to individual households has in fact brought serious land 
degradation as a consequence of limiting livestock movement. Based on the premise that 
the grasslands are misused and wasted and that reform is needed to ensure more effective 
rational use of pastures (Bauer 2005: 61), practitioners have often worked with existing 
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policy to tackle the symptoms rather than the causes of land degradation and lower 
productivity (Squires et al. 2010).  
 
Since the beginning of the project, degradational narratives were generated as 
institutionalized “truths” (Foucault 1991), drawn from power and based on the 
application of a supposedly universal science. For example, boundaries between UR 
household allocations in order to establish exclusion areas and determine processes for 
monitoring of pasture status, were defined using GIS imagery, in complete disregard of 
available and well tested participatory tools (see Hessel et al. 2009; Chambers 2006).  
Technique such as “participatory land-use planning” and indigenous mapping of pastures, 
with maps based on transects and participatory meetings with herders at the aili/gacha 
level were introduced during the revision, as part of the new community-centered 
approach. However, this more time-consuming approach to establishing UR was not 
favoured by the project managers and state agencies as it uncovered serious boundary 
problems and communal conflicts. 
 
UR therefore requires a flexible and localised approach, combined with community-
development (CD) aimed at identifying regular and accessible markets and moving 
towards greater group-based reliance. Without a CD process, local elites and power 
interests are likely to ride the policy to their own advantage as in the case of the project. 
At many project gacha, wealthier herders would either ignore policy directives where 
that did not suit their own interests, or interpret them in convenient ways, as in the case of 
overriding grazing bans, or manipulating use-right leases (issued in 1996) based on the 
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ratio of household-animal numbers (Taylor 2006: 376). These phenomena need serious 
analysis as they negate the intent of government policy to tackle the integrated and 
complex causes of land degradation. In terms of UR certification, the earlier phase of the 
project included no consideration for ensuring women’s access rights (women in their 
agnatic natal households and as wives in their husband’s household). 
 
Indeed, in the IMGMP gacha many poorer female-headed households were excluded 
from formal UR working-group meetings and other sources of information. Incidence of 
TB was particularly high in poorer aili and families unable to buy medicines. In a number 
of households women carried much of the burden and were left responsible for all 
herding activities. In most villages, women seldom attend formal meetings or ceremonies, 
lack information other than what they are told from their husbands and lack control over 
money. Busy with household chores (cooking, feeding pigs, tending home gardens, and 
generally looking after the family) women said that they rarely had time to socialise 
among themselves:  “we women are too busy... men attend family ceremonies and go 
there to talk. We are busy in the daytime with our work, so we don’t visit each other. 
There is no ending of work, so we have no time”.11  
 
 
A more critical position is needed to understand the social, economic, and ecological 
impact of enclosures in (dryland) non-equilibrium contexts
12. The state’s problem-solving 
was on technicalities such as animal/feed ratios, the introduction of exotic breeds (for 
example the Merino sheep, for wool production, although the herders prefer the more 
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resilient and tasty Mongolian Fat Tail); all-year-round enclosures (leading to deteriorated 
animal health, as in increased contagious respiratory diseases, also relating to poor 
nutrition and poor management of housed animals); deferred spring grazing regime (two-
three months, April-June); silage maize cultivars and leguminous Alfalfa (although it was 
later acknowledged that Alfalfa is a difficult plant to establish due to alkali soils). The 
exemplary use of model-herding practices and showcase research stations (out of the 
reach of poor producers) was reconsidered in the post-2002 revisions of IMGMP. Instead, 
farmer field schools (FFS) were established at gacha-level, in the attempt to get closer to 
the herders and make use of existing local ecological knowledge/s. Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) methods were used for the first time in the league in 2002 to generate 
shared knowledge on environment and management and needs to be pursued in further 
work in the region.  
 
 
Solving the Problem through “Engineering” the Grasslands 
 
The management of the grasslands is seen by the state as an “engineering” concern 
needing grassland “protection” (perimeter fencing) and “construction” (planting Alfalfa 
and Poplar trees)
13
. There was a sense of urgency in attempting to fix the problem in the 
eastern Inner Mongolian steppes before the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 given the 
distant drift of fine sand particles across the Chinese metropolis. The attitude towards 
planned material transformation and domestication of nature, land reclamation and the 
ordering of social arrangements has its modern antecedents under Mao’s revolution (see 
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Shapiro 2001). In scientific fervour, the “Grasslands Ecological, Environmental 
Protection and Development Plan of China 2001-2010” suggested fixing the problem of 
desertification with a “combination of new biological, engineering and agricultural 
methods”. 
 
The grassland scientific community in China unanimously concur on the actual causes 
and the possible solutions to this environmental problem:  too many grazing animals and 
the need for reduced stocking. However, pastoralists believe that the most critical 
considerations are seasonal variations in forage production, biomass availability and 
temporality. Despite widespread concerns for a “degradation problem” surprisingly little 
attention has been given to cultural practices and human motivations of grassland 
inhabitants. There is now overwhelming evidence that the commons, far from being free-
for-all, are cared for under well-understood community access and management rules
14
. 
In regard to pastoral systems, common resources can be managed sustainably where there 
are few marked social differentiations among groups; similar production regimes; 
recognition of shared benefits from group membership; and where rules controlling 
resource use are effectively enforced by the herding group/s.
15
 Recent socio-ecological 
research in Inner Mongolia (see for instance Ho 2001, Williams 2002, Taylor 2006, and 
Banks 2003) has shown that, contrary to Hardin’s (1968) simplistic “tragedy of the 
commons” argument16, individual enclosures and the household responsibility system 
since 1983 have not (ipso facto) improved either ecological stability or quality of 
livelihoods.   
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In the project, private enclosures were not always the preferred option for herders, except 
outside richer tenant herders. In terms of rationalisation and economies of scale, many 
expressed interest in small rotational group herding arrangements. A similar result was 
also recorded by research in north-western China, showing that grassland contracts under 
“group tenure” are more appropriate socially (as in the reluctance to subdivide pastures 
for fear of household conflicts), environmentally (as in given the seasonal patchy 
resources), and economically (as in achieving essential economies of scale) (Banks 2001; 
Banks et al 2003).  
 
Local households’ understood the notion of “group” as based on extended kinship17. It is 
also important in arid and semi-arid ecosystems to ensure social safeguards through 
secure access to pastures for poorer herders and new herding households. Community-
based management allows for greater flexibility and mobility, an important factor when 
operating in conditions of great variability. Nevertheless, community-based management 
is not entirely supported by the current legal/regulatory framework which stresses tenured 
household enclosures. Communities are also reliant on regional and state mechanisms in 
matters such as conflict resolution and the regulation of stocking rates through the 
AAHB. Participatory workshops with pastoralists in semi-desertified Kerquin grasslands 
indicated a preference for: (1) no fences or household allocations (the cause of much 
antagonism among households); and (2) rotational groups of four to ten agnatic 
households using limit-range transhumant seasonal grazing regimen. This system 
facilitates joint use of pasture and equitable access to resources, especially marginal and 
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seasonally patchy resources that would otherwise not be easily subdivided between 
households (in more densely populated semi-pastoral areas this is particularly important).  
 
 
Thinking New Ecology in the Grasslands 
 
It is clear that science should be partnered with local agro-ecological knowledge. The 
various league and banner level arms of AAHB conducted limited assessments of above-
ground biomass productivity to estimate the maximum tonnage of grassland primary 
productivity that can be grazed sustainably (SCC of an area). The notion of a definitive 
SCC embodying land productivity and climate variations at a particular grazing site is 
fundamental to conventional grassland science.  
 
SCC is expressed as the highest number of animals that an area could sustainably support 
with estimates based on assumptions about the impact of livestock on plants and plant 
succession
18
. Still seen as an important management tool in fighting resource 
degradation, SCC assumes a direct correlation between number of animals and grazing 
area and that the herder has full control of the grazing rights. This is hardly useful in any 
case for herders grazing commons (Hocking and Mattick 1993). In African work Abel 
and Blaikie (1990) proposed a “tracking strategy” for stocking rates as an alternative to 
the CC concept following variation in rainfall, thereby optimising resource use. Abel (in 
Hocking and Mattick 1993: 18) noted the importance of consulting resource-users who 
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have greater technical knowledge of their own production environment than that of the 
scientist.  
 
So how practical and relevant is SCC in Inner Mongolia? An Australian farm-
management specialist working with IMGMP indicated that the problem of overstocking 
and consequent degradation can be solved if 500 kg of dry matter (DM) per hectare is left 
as groundcover (factoring in assumptions about rainfall and SCC). A simple enough 
statement – but much harder to interpret in a meaningful way in the field, where different 
human actors have their own understanding of what defines degradation and sustainable 
resource use.  SCC assumes that the conditions for plant growth remain the same and its 
assumptions are based on one category of livestock being kept in a definite area 
(excluding important niche resources), under one modality of management. Pastoralists, 
on the other hand, focus on the consideration of spatial and temporal variability, 
including maintenance of locally-defined stocking rates on common pastures (though 
well below a highly variable ecological SCC). 
 
The notion of the superiority of science over vernacular/endogenous knowledge (Howes 
and Chambers 1979; Agrawal 1995) dominates the debate on pasture management (Hesse 
1978). In Inner Mongolia, the technical setting of stocking rates relies on long-term 
stocking-rate records combined with monitoring information (this was the function of the 
AAHB Grassland Monitoring Stations). When long-term stocking rate records are not 
available, measuring the annual forage yield in the area being grazed is considered the 
best alternative.  However, as forage yield varies from year to year, measurement is best 
over a number of years to give a long-term stocking rate.  
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Annual forage yields were measured by clipping the forage in late summer using a series 
of representative quadrats in the management unit. The clipped material was then air-
dried and weighed, and the weights then averaged over the number of quadrats measured. 
The average weight was expressed as kilograms of dry forage per mu (Houston et al. 
2004: 19). So for instance a stocking rate may be expressed as 6.8 (warm season), 15.9 
(cold season), and throughout the year 22.8 mu/sheep unit
19
.The notion of CC constitutes 
the foundation of conventional grassland science and sees successive changes in plant 
species composition and how this is affected by particular stocking rates on pastures. It 
has been suggested that Inner Mongolian grasslands have a theoretical stocking capacity 
(per million livestock units) of 23.82, though the actual stocking capacity as a percentage 
of the theoretical stocking capacity is a massive 330 (Lu in Waldron et al. 2008).  
 
In New Ecology, rather than succession, more complex species, animal and human 
(social and cultural) interactions take place as an interdependent system. This necessitates 
a more holistic, multidisciplinary approach to grassland management. Therefore, to be 
useful, SCC must be related to real production objectives, which determine the particular 
plane of nutrition (de Vries and Djitèye in Hocking and Mattick 1993: 10). For that 
reason alone, and the over-emphasis on DM intake and seasonal and annual production of 
above-ground biomass, new ecologists argue that aside from Total Dry Matter (TDM) it 
should also be linked to crude protein content (=Nitrogen x 6.5), and energy and mineral 
levels in the TDM. Hocking and Mattick (1993) also explain that the nutritive values of 
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grasses change throughout the growing season, with Nitrogen levels, digestibility, 
declining steadily after ear emergence.  
 
Nomadic “post-traditional” pastoral regimes need flexible pasture arrangements allowing 
for continuance of social norms such as reciprocity. These may at times put pressure on a 
group’s grazing resource and local management and monitoring of common resources. 
Such a management system needs to be able to regulate the use of niche resources in 
relation to stocking rates, seasonal primary production levels (most severe on “cold 
season” grasslands and throughout the region spring-autumn pastures), with an agreed 
basis for the implementation of UR. This is more likely to be sustainable and culturally 




The issuance of household UR and fences in the early project had negative impact on 
herd mobility/productivity. Herds/flocks respond well to ecological heterogeneity. 
Similarly, having a variety of species in a given zone makes best use of these ecosystems. 
Management strategies should incorporate limited seasonal animal movement to make 
use of the best green matter in a given season or year. As a pragmatic stance of 
maximizing feeding quality, some degree of livestock movement is needed. Herders 
consider landscape variability (especially the presence of green matter and the nature of 
the soil) important for production and, while grass is in a Levi-Straussian sense (1996 
[1962]) “good to think” (as in symbolic systems of collective meaning and identity), for 
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livestock it is certainly “good to eat”. Indeed, animals need shelter from wind, moisture, 
feed, shade, and exposure to a variety of seasonal forage, in different amounts at different 
times of the year (Williams 2002: 181). This is an effective response to the uncertainties 
of a harsh natural environment and improves land productivity.  
 
The UR system should consider that common resources are not dependent on individual 
households alone, but group/community decisions; the grassland is a community asset. In 
the project area, aside from individual households with allocated enclosures, SCC was 
not able to consider who the effective decision makers are as decisions were often made 
outside the local herding community. Another concern was that while the project had to 
show how to make UR policy work, most of the grassland (97%) had already been 
allocated some years earlier in ad-hoc fashion based on hasty allocations and unclear 
boundaries. UR certificates were distributed to households without clear boundaries; 
there was little if any community consultation or use of vernacular maps; inadequately 
trained officials from the AAHB and Sumu and political pressure from the League 
Government. As a consequence many household and wider community conflicts 
emerged. As noted earlier, allocations were based on household-livestock numbers 
(nominally 6: 4) though often “massaged” at the local level to favour elites. This situation 
in Xing’an League, contrasts with the first introduction of UR in neighbouring Xilingol 
League, where land was distributed solely on the number of household members. 
 
But, as the project managers found out, family composition (and animal numbers) change 
over time and conflicts erupted as the result of intensification on UR grasslands and 
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resultant land fragmentation. In virilocal residence, sons eventually want to establish their 
own new nuclear households requiring separate allocations within existing parental 
household UR allocations. UR was allocated to households on conditions at the time of 
issuance. It is important to determine how land tenure arrangements are contributing to 
increasing fragmentation and changing land use patterns and how to integrate this 
knowledge into better policy application. 
 
The model CC used in the project comes from countries under high-rainfall perennial 
pastures and capital-intensive management (see Dijkman 1999). Indeed, CC is based on 
single livestock species, extensive systems of fencing and based on the maximisation of 
production gains per head/per unit of labour. In eastern Inner Mongolia, pastoralists often 
run mixed species herds, whose production outcomes are directed towards human and 
animal survival, milk, wool, capital accumulation and risk aversion. Pastoralists living in 
non-equilibrium ecosystems need CC estimates that accordingly make use of flexible and 
opportunistic arrangements. Reducing stocking rates is at odds with herders’ objectives as 
this importantly means reduced productivity per/Ha. Pasture degradation has as much to 
do with unworkable policies, agro-pastoral practices and restricted mobility as stocking 
rates per se.  
 
 
Are there evidence-based alternatives to conventional “equilibrium” grassland 
management? In non-equilibrium dynamics stochastic variation is a significant factor, 
while plant biomass is regulated by abiotic determinants such as temperature, rainfall and 
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wind (Behnke and Scoones 1993; Fernandez-Gimenez and Allen-Diaz 1999). Indeed, 
vegetation dynamics in the arid steppes is clearly under the control of climate rather than 
grazing pressure. Recent work in Northwest Tibet showed that rather than a system of 
rigid stocking rates, “opportunistic” strategies adapted to annual variable vegetation 
production were preferred (Tsechoe Dorji et al. 2010). In the project alternative group 
management with greater mobility/flexibility started to emerge between the constraints of 
policy in response to unpredictable climate (see also Da in Wang 2007: 1).  In one 
Middle Banner aili pastoralists noted that the height of grass in the 1960s was 100cm, but 
now only 16-20cm and said this was due to both climate change and state fencing 
policies. These herders said that a solution to grazing pressures and severe loss of 
biomass was in a seasonal rotational system without fences managed by agnates in the 
gacha (2-4 aili) under community rules. Indeed, often small group herding may be the 
only viable option given patchy, poor quality biomass, and limited water sources. In these 
resource-scarce situations fencing exacerbated household conflicts.  
 
As an example of one village in the project area, the contracted household UR system 
came into effect in 1988. The UR allocation implies rights to graze a proportion of the 
total community herd and also a share in hay land for spring and winter fodder. 
Adjustments were made for hay land 1983 to 1988 corresponding to changes in both the 
number of people and livestock (ratio of 7:3). The village also divided the grazing pasture 
among households using the same formal criteria with the stipulation this was to remain 
unchanged for 30 years, regardless of changes to human/ livestock numbers. However, 
regardless, the community continued to graze their animals freely according to informal 
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rules. In the view of villagers, the pasture belongs to the community under specific local 
rules, as in the case of cattle dividing all the animals in the village into groups to graze in 
different areas to avoid overgrazing, trampling and erosion. Every spring, households 
would send a member to attend meetings to discuss grazing allocations, rotation and 
direction in the coming year. Despite new UR regulations, it was usual for these inter-
household kindred to graze animals in the same site or direction for convenience and 





Imposing SCC has a high cost of enforcement and an increasingly questionable technical 
validity in temperate dryland systems. As well, household fences, which were well 
funded by banner governments from 2002 onwards, are now often despised by small 
herders as they are seen to create more problems than they set out to solve. Ultimately, 
the paper argues, grassland management should be as much a community responsibility as 
local government entailing a radical shift in the “household responsibility” system. The 
effort at introducing a new participatory CD process, involving the identification of all 
stakeholders, conducting reflection workshops, PRAs and the like, is only the beginning 
of work that needs consistent and dedicated attention from funders. Indeed, the 
degradation “problem” is not necessarily one for science alone to answer, or external 
technical fixes, but involves first and foremost anthropogenic considerations: It is about 
people, local herding traditions and changing cultural practices under increasing resource 
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constraints. Conversations must involve gacha/aili level social (herding) groups, such as 
extended agnates, local cadres, and even the increasingly marginalised, poor non-herding 
households.  Finally, there needs to be a rational compromise between SCC estimates 
made by outsiders and local definitions. If not, there will be no longer-term and 
community-agreed responsibility and commitment to the management and monitoring of 
grassland resources.  
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1
 See Franchetti (2008) on the proto-historical importance of mobility among regional 
pastoralists. 
2
 Some scholars prefer the term “semi-private property rights”, first initiated on Xilingol 
League which has the largest area of pastures in China. See for instance Wen Jun Li, 
Saleem H Ali, and Qian Zhang 2007. These authors, like so many scholars in the past 
decade, argue for a community-based contract system.   
3
 Pseudonym for project in the article was “Anxin” because of commercial-in-confidence 
rule at the time of writing; but in fact it was the now “completed” China-Australia “Inner 
Mongolia Grassland Management Project: Phase II”, based at the city of Ulanhot, 
Xing’an League , Inner Mongolia. 
4
 I am grateful to Professor Zhu Xaoyang (Institute of Sociology and Anthropology, 
Peking University) for assisting in the 2004 ethnographic surveys. 
5
 User Rights/UR, or so-called “Two Rights – One System” means two rights (rights of 
ownership held by both state and/or collective; in the case of IMAR this is only at the 
collective or administrative village level, and actual use-rights). The “one system” means 
household contracting obligations; otherwise known as “contracting-out”, a means of 
semi-privatisation. UR was adapted from the late 1970s “household responsibility 
system” on arable land to pastoral systems introduced in 1983 to Inner Mongolia though 
refined in 1997. The “UR household contracting system” comes from the 1985 China’s 
Grassland Law. It involves issuing 30-year user-certificates on reallocated pastures in 
accordance with China’s emphasis on encouraging household production incentives. 
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6
 SCC/ha = net supply/intake per Livestock Unit – based on total herbaceous forage 
productivity (as total dry matter TDM). It is assumed that livestock require a daily DM 
intake equivalent to 2.5% to 3.0% of their bodyweight. 
7
 Stocking rate is the number of animal units on a certain area for a specified time period 
(Society for Range Management 1998). 
8
 Banks suggests that under communal group land-tenure (res communis) a common 
boundary is best whereby everyone in a social contract can contribute to “policing” 
regulations.  
9
 The method for estimating stocking rates from forage yield is given by the “Standard of 
Suitable Stocking Capacity of Natural Grassland” (Measurement and Standard Bureau of 
Inner Mongolia 1990). 
10
 The first league in Inner Mongolia to introduce the household contract/user rights 
system in 1984. 
11
 Interview conducted in 2004 with 46 year old Mrs Bai Lianhua, wife of the Party 
Secretary of Manglai Gacha, Middle Banner. 
12
 See for instance May (1989). 
13
 For a discussion on the negative impacts of ecological “construction” policy see Hong 
Jiang (2006). 
14
 In other words, understanding natural resources as “Common Pool Resource”, as 
earlier argued by political economist Elinor Ostrom (2002) among others; see also 
Gardner et al. 1990.  
15
 Agrawal (2001) suggests the need for a more systematic and integrated understanding 
of the various factors relevant in the sustainability of the commons. 
16
 Hardin’s argument in practice has not been shown to ensure sustainability or the 
prevention of a “tragedy”; instead self-organising and self-governing commons’ systems 
have been shown to work well (de Young 1999). For a useful discussion in relation to 
pastoralists see Williams (2002:74-77), also Scoones (1996) and Bromley and Cernea 
(1989).  
17
 Zukosky, in his work with the Altai Kazakhs, talks about “tribal” sentiment (2008: 49).  
18
 As an example of this science-based analysis based on remote sensing data (normalized 
difference vegetation index [NDVI]) and attitudes to anthropogenic causation for 
degradation, see Kensuke Kawamura et al. 2003, and Liang E.Y. et al. 2005. 
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